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The search for a balance between the duty of government to safe-
guard its citizens and the individual rights of those protected is a constant 
struggle.  One of the key ways in which government engages in national 
security protection is by information gathering.  National security is by 
definition a responsive activity – that is, a government must anticipate 
before, or react after someone else has taken some kind of threatening 
action.  Because of this, acquiring information about other people‟s 
doings is essential.  Most certainly through technological advancement at 
the end of the 20
th
 and beginning of the 21
st
 century, information gather-
ing has become a booming governmental business.  Never before were so 
many opportunities to learn things about persons or events and the means 
to process those data more available.  As a consequence, governments 
adopt information gathering policies and introduce legislation by which 
its agents have to abide, but which can also offer specific techniques to 
do their jobs.   
The flip side of the coin is that we have to adapt to the fact that 
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there is a substantial amount of information available out there, including 
information about our private lives – information we would sometimes 
like no one else to have.  In general, societies directed by the rule of law 
consider that governments should only gather information about us when 
it is useful to reach a goal more important than our personal right to be 
the manager of what gets known about us.  Even then, it is accepted that 
the government cannot route through such information in any way, and at 
any cost.  A balance, therefore, must be sought between these conflicting 
interests.  In the last decades the issue has become more precarious: to-
day information is more abundantly available than ever, and societies 
and their governments are faced with wider and more differentiated secu-
rity threats.  Finding the difficult balance between our rights to collective 
protection and the right to individual freedom to live without governmen-
tal interference is a complicated matter which continues to evolve.  
In what follows, the special information gathering techniques that a 
government can or cannot engage in when national security is at stake 
are discussed.  They are examined primarily from a privacy point of 
view, but some of the techniques also raise due process questions.  More 
specifically, the way these issues are dealt with in Europe will be dis-
cussed.  The European continent has a long and outstanding history of 
human rights protection through the application of the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), the key treaty adopted by the 
Members States of the Council of Europe (not to be confused with the 
European Union), which has gradually assumed the role of a pan-
European Bill of Rights.  Logically, the jurisprudence of its jurisdictional 
body, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “the Court”), 
will be at the center of the discussion.  It is not the intention of this con-
tribution to provide a detailed analysis of the pro‟s and con‟s of its views, 
but it may provide a first look at how the Court, confronted with national 
security issues, deals with the protection of certain basic fundamental 
rights.  First, the phenomenon of governments acting in secret will be il-
lustrated (infra Part I).  Second, the Council of Europe‟s political frame-
work on special investigation techniques (infra Part II) and the legal 
principles regarding special investigation techniques and fundamental 
rights (infra Part III) are analyzed.  The principles of legal certainty, 
judicial control on government action, subsidiarity and proportionality 
are key elements to the issue of privacy protection.  An examination of a 
number of special investigation techniques interfering with the right to 
privacy (infra Part IV) and the right to a fair trial (infra Part V) will be 
made, before coming to some general conclusions (infra Part VI). 
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I.  GOVERNMENTS ACTING IN SECRET 
In general, different types of government agents may want to en-
gage in the gathering of information.  They are usually not all competent 
to do so, though.  For example, there are limits on the methods tax ser-
vices can engage in to get information on your assets.  When national se-
curity is involved, or when a serious crime has been committed, there are 
often special investigation techniques available to specific government 
agencies, whether they be a specialized part of the police force or an in-
telligence agency.  According to the Commission for Democracy 
Through Law,
1
 which is the Council of Europe‟s advisory body on con-
stitutional matters, there seem to be two schools of thought on the ques-
tion of how those security services should be organized.  “In some Euro-
pean countries, the security services are independent organizations which 
are not part of the ordinary police force, whereas in other European 
States the security services are one of many specialised branches of the 
general police force.”
2
  
As a consequence, it is not always possible to treat the police forces 
and intelligence services separately.  The position of organs with special 
investigation capacities within government depends on the constitutional 
and legal framework of the State.  The Venice Commission observed that 
in some European countries the role of internal security services is li-
mited to the gathering of intelligence and to the subsequent analysis and 
interpretation of the material.
3
  Any preventive or enforcement functions 
lie then with the ordinary police or other organs of law enforcement.  In 
other countries, internal security organs may have preventive and en-
forcement functions as well, especially with regard to actions directed 
against the security of the State.  “Particularly in the countries where the 
security services are part of ordinary police, the security service police 
officers are allowed to perform the same acts as other police officers, . . 
.” like tapping telephones.
4
 
Evidently, it is important to define the notion “special investigation 
                                                             
1 Generally referred to as the “Venice Commission.” 
2 Council of Europe, Venice Comm‟n., Report: Internal Security Services in Europe, 
34th Plenary meeting, CDL-INF006 (1998), available at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1998/CDL-INF(1998)006-e.asp [hereinafter Venice 
Commission Report]. 
3 Id. at 9. 
4 Id. 
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technique.”  However, there does not seem to be a generally accepted le-
gal definition.  In any case, certain elements are identifiable.  For exam-
ple, all techniques usually called to be special involve some kind of 
secrecy or deception.  In practice, a measure is secret when the investi-
gating authorities try to hide what they do from the subject of the tech-
nique.  If the subject knew about the technique being applied to him, he 
would change his plans; if a criminal knew his telephone was wire-
tapped, one can reasonably assume that he would not plan further crimes 
by phone.  As the Venice Commission noted, internal security organiza-
tions, or police in general, are in many cases free from outside adminis-
trative interference.
5
  That freedom from outside supervision may keep 
the activities in question rather effectively free from surveillance by the 
media, the general public, and interested or affected individuals: “Secre-
cy may, indeed, to a certain extent be necessary for the success of securi-
ty operations. It may, however, also harm important general or individual 
interests, which makes the regulation of these questions a delicate mat-
ter.”
6
 
Deceptive investigative techniques on the other hand are not applied 
in hidden conditions, but make the subject believe something to be true 
which in reality is not.  These techniques do not just conceal information; 
they add false information to the case.  The core of these techniques is 
that the authorities believe that this intentionally-provoked misunders-
tanding will facilitate prosecution or the gathering of further information.  
If a police officer infiltrates a criminal organization by pretending to be a 
criminal, he might get access to interesting information. 
II.   COUNCIL OF EUROPE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK REGARDING SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES 
Among the Council of Europe‟s political bodies, the Committee of 
Ministers (infra Part A) and the Parliamentary Assembly (infra Part B), 
have issued a number of guidelines to the Member States concerning 
special investigation techniques and guaranteeing fundamental rights. 
A. The Committee of Ministers 
In 2005, the Council of Europe, through its Committee of Ministers, 
made a recommendation to the Member States on special investigation 
                                                             
5 Id. at 10. 
6 Id. 
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techniques relating to serious crimes, including acts of terrorism.  The 
Committee is mindful of the obligation on Member States to maintain a 
fair balance between ensuring public safety through law enforcement 
measures and securing the rights of individuals, as enshrined in the pro-
visions of the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR in particular.  In the 
Council of Europe‟s recommendation, special investigation techniques 
are defined as techniques “applied by the competent authorities in the 
context of criminal investigations for the purpose of detecting and inves-
tigating serious crimes and suspects, aim[ed] at gathering information in 
such a way as not to alert the target persons.”7 
 
The Committee observed that special investigation techniques are 
numerous, varied, and constantly evolving and that their common cha-
racteristics are their secret nature and that their application could inter-
fere with fundamental rights and freedoms.
8
  Nevertheless, the use of 
special investigation techniques is considered a vital tool for the fight 
against the most serious forms of crime, including acts of terrorism.  The 
Committee also pointed out that the “use of special investigation tech-
niques in criminal investigations requires confidentiality and that . . . the 
commission of serious crime, including acts of terrorism should, wherev-
er appropriate, be thwarted with secured covert means of operation.”9 
Three general principles are formulated: (1) Member States should, 
in accordance with the requirements of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, define in their national legislation the conditions under 
which the authorities are empowered to resort to special investigation 
techniques; (2) define when this is considered necessary in a democratic 
society and is considered appropriate for efficient criminal investigation 
and prosecution; and (3) Member States should “ensure adequate control 
of the implementation of special investigation techniques by judicial au-
thorities or other independent bodies through prior authorisation [and] 
                                                             
7 Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation:  Special Inves-
tigation Techniques in Relation to Serious Crimes Including Acts of Terrorism, 
2, Rec(2005)10 (Apr. 20, 2005), available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=838445&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&Ba
ckColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864  [hereinafter Committee 
of Ministers, Recommendation]. 
8 Id. at 1-2. 
9 Id. at 7. 
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supervision during the investigation or ex post facto review.”10 
Many of these conditions of use proposed by the Committee, as will 
be shown below, are part of the review process of the ECtHR.  The 
Committee noted that special investigation techniques should only be 
used where there is sufficient reason to believe that a serious crime has 
been committed or prepared, or is being prepared, by one or more partic-
ular persons or an unidentified individual or group of individuals.  Pro-
portionality between the effects of the use of special investigation tech-
niques and the objective that has been identified is essential.  In this 
respect, an evaluation should be made in light of the seriousness of the 
offense and the intrusive nature of the specific special investigation tech-
nique used.  Furthermore, Member States need to ensure that their au-
thorities apply less intrusive methods if such methods enable the offence 
to be detected, prevented or prosecuted with adequate effectiveness.  
This principle adds a condition of subsidiarity.  Member States are equal-
ly required to “take appropriate legislative measures to permit the pro-
duction of evidence gained from the use of special investigation tech-
niques” in court, in order to “safeguard the rights of the accused to a fair 
trial.”11 
B. The Parliamentary Assembly 
In 1998, the Venice Commission issued a report on the constitution-
al relations between internal security services and other organs of the 
State at the request of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu-
rope (PACE).
12
  It found that: 
[U]ndoubtedly, a variety of internal and external situations may arise in 
which the executive organ of the State must act quickly and decisively to 
protect the fundamental interests of the State and society. There must be a 
consensus that only this need may possibly justify the derogation from 
normal human rights standards which may sometimes be necessary to en-
sure the proper and effective functioning of National Security Services. It is 
this derogation that provokes the need for particular attention to be given to 
the manner in which these services must be set up, the regulation and con-
trol of their activities and their proper place within the constitutional 
framework of the country.13  
The Venice Commission recalled that internal security services have in-
                                                             
10Id. at 8. 
11 Id. at 9. 
12 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2. 
13 Id. at 4. 
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bred in them a potential for the abuse of State power – as the Commis-
sion pointed out, there have been innumerable incidences of the most se-
rious violations of human rights committed in the name of internal secu-
rity.
14
 “Hence the need for the constitutional order to identify what 
should be the role of internal security services within a democratic socie-
ty, what should be their place within the constitutional framework, their 
functions and limitations and what method of control should be exercised 
over their activities.”
15
 According to the Commission, the aim of such 
services should also be to provide protection from possible espionage, 
terrorism and sabotage from foreign powers; to investigate actions which 
aim at undermining democracy; and to undertake the secret surveillance 
of subversive elements operating within a country‟s jurisdiction.
16
 
In 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly observed that in previous 
years, as a result of the rise in terrorism and crime, European societies 
have felt an increasing need for security.
17
  “Some of today‟s security 
threats, such as international organized crime, international terrorism and 
arms proliferation, increasingly affect both internal and external security 
and therefore require responses by the services of the security sector, pre-
ferably co-ordinated and overseen on a European level.”
18
  With regard 
to the security sector, the Council of Europe recommended a general 
framework, including the following principles: (a) the functioning of in-
telligence services must be based on clear and appropriate legislation su-
pervised by the courts; (b) each parliament should have an appropriately 
functioning specialized committee; (c) conditions for the use of excep-
tional measures by these services must be laid down by the law in precise 
limits of time; and (d) under no circumstances should the intelligence 
services be politicized, as they must be able to report to policy makers in 
an objective, impartial, and professional manner. Any restrictions im-
posed on the civil and political rights of security personnel need to be 
prescribed by law.
19
 In addition, confidentiality and accountability inter-
ests can be managed through the principle of deferred transparency, that 
                                                             
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 20. 
17 Eur. Consult. Ass. Deb., 23rd Sess. 1713 (June 23, 2005), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta05/EREC1713.htm [herein-after Par-
liamentary Assembly Resolution]. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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is, by declassifying confidential material after a period of time prescribed 
by law.  Finally, the PACE considered that parliament must be kept regu-
larly informed about changes which could affect the general intelligence 
policy.
20
 
With regard to the police forces, the Council recommended that (a) 
in each State a specific legal framework for the functioning and supervi-
sion of a democratic police force must be set up; (b) given their different 
mandate and competences, it is considered important that legislation dis-
tinguishes between security and intelligence services on the one hand, 
and law enforcement agencies on the other; (c) the police must remain 
neutral and not be subject to any political influence; and (d) police offic-
ers must be given training covering humanitarian principles, constitu-
tional safeguards, and standards deriving from codes of ethics laid down 
by international organizations such as the United Nations, the Council of 
Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE).
21
  The PACE stated that it is essential that this sector, which 
traditionally lacks transparency, be overseen by democratic institutions 
and subject to democratic procedures:  “Exceptional measures in any 
field must be supervised by parliaments and should not seriously hamper 
the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights.”
22
 
III.     ECTHR GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES 
As the Venice Commission observed, constitutional norms bearing 
specifically on the internal security services (and the techniques they ap-
ply) are rare.  In fact, the existence of such specific constitutional norms 
is not necessary.  What is essential, however, is that legislation or regula-
tions pertaining to internal security organs be in harmony with the Con-
stitution: 
In theory, of course, if the existence of internal security services is en-
trenched in constitutional provisions, built-in constitutional guarantees 
would increase the protection afforded to interests which are potentially 
threatened by the actions of internal security services. On the other hand, 
however, provision in the Constitution might lend undue constitutional le-
gitimacy or status to such an institution.
23
 
                                                             
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 6. 
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For all Member States, the ECHR, in Article 8, provides that everyone 
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his 
correspondence.
24
  Any interference by a public authority with the exer-
cise of this right is prohibited:  
[E]xcept such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the eco-
nomic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.25 
Furthermore, in the words of the European Court of Human Rights: 
[T]his paragraph, since it provides for an exception to a right guaranteed by 
the Convention, is to be narrowly interpreted. Powers of secret surveillance 
of citizens, characterizing as they do the police state, are tolerable under the 
Convention only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the demo-
cratic institutions.
26
 
Once an interference with a fundamental right is established (infra Part 
A), it can only be considered legitimate if the measure is in accordance 
with the law (infra Part B), serves a legitimate goal and is necessary in a 
democratic society (infra Part C). 
A. The Existence of an Interference 
In general, the Court interprets the notion of “interference” in the 
context of privacy rather widely.  The Court in Klass v. Germany deter-
mined that an individual could submit an application concerning secret 
surveillance measures, without being able to point to any concrete meas-
ure specifically affecting him.  The Court held that:  
[I]f this were not so, the efficiency of the Convention‟s enforcement ma-
chinery would be materially weakened. The procedural provisions of the 
Convention must, in view of the fact that the Convention and its institutions 
were set up to protect the individual, be applied in a manner which serves 
to make the system of individual applications efficacious. The Court there-
fore accepts that an individual may, under certain conditions, claim to be 
                                                             
24 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8 
¶ 1, Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://con-
ventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. 
25 Id. ¶ 2. 
26 Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 ¶ 42 (1980). 
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the victim of a violation occasioned by the mere existence of secret meas-
ures or of legislation permitting secret measures, without having to allege 
that such measures were in fact applied to him.27  
The Court found it unacceptable that the assurance of the enjoyment of a 
right guaranteed by the Convention could be removed by the simple fact 
that the person concerned is kept unaware of its violation.  Thus, the ex-
istence of legislation allowing secret surveillance in itself amounts to an 
interference with Article 8.
28
 As will be shown with more detail in infra 
Part IV, however, some government actions do not self-evidently amount 
to an interference. 
B. Measure in Accordance with the Law 
In the analysis of the Court, for a measure to be in accordance with 
the law, it should be foreseeable (infra Part 1), it should be accompanied 
by safeguards against abuse (infra Part 2), and control tools should be 
provided (infra Part 3). 
 1.    Foreseeability 
The fulfillment of the first condition may seem somewhat simple. 
The ECtHR, however, is rather exigent.  Settled case-law explains that 
the expression “in accordance with the law” not only requires that the 
impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, but that it 
also refer to the quality of the law in question.  Referring to the quality of 
the law requires that a measure should be compatible with the rule of 
law, accessible to the person concerned, and foreseeable as to its ef-
fects.
29
 
                                                             
27 Klass, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 34; see, e.g., Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 56 (2008); Iordachi v. Moldova, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 30 (2009). 
28 See, e.g., Ass‟n for Eur. Integration and Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 
62540/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 69 (2007). 
29 See Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 ¶¶ 66-67 
(1984); Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 ¶¶ 50-51 (1987); 
Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84, Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 29 (1990); Kruslin v. France, App. 
No. 11801/85, Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 30 (1990); Kopp v. Switzerland, App. No. 23224/94, 
 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶¶ 63-64 (1998); Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, App. No. 27671/95, 
 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 46 (1998); Amann v. Switzerland, App. No. 27798/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 
50-56 (2000); Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 55 (2000); Doerga 
v. Netherlands, App. No. 51210/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 45 (2004); Antunes Rocha v. Portug-
al, App. No. 64330/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 66-67; Van der Velden v. Netherlands, App. No. 
29514/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 2 (2006); Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00,  Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 93 (2006);  Dumitru Popescu v. Romania, App. No. 71525/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 61 
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In the jurisprudence of the Court, “foreseeable” means that a rule is 
formulated with sufficient precision to enable any individual to regulate 
his conduct, if necessary after taking advice.  In addition, the phrase im-
plies that there must be a measure of legal protection in domestic law 
against arbitrary interferences by public authorities.  The Court has noted 
in various cases that the risk of arbitrariness is especially evident when a 
power of the executive is exercised in secret.
30
  Obviously, in the context 
of secret surveillance measures, the requirement of foreseeability cannot 
mean that an individual know when the authorities are likely, for exam-
ple, to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct ac-
cordingly.  Nevertheless, “the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms 
to give [citizens] an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which 
and the conditions on which public authorities are entitled to resort to 
such covert measures.”31 
 2.     Safeguards Against Abuse 
In addition, adequate and effective safeguards against abuse must 
exist.  The Court pointed out that anything less would be unacceptable; a 
system of secret surveillance designed to protect national security entails 
the risk of “undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of 
defending it.”32  In the Klass case of 1978, which was the earliest land-
mark judgment, the Court noted that it: 
[M]ust be satisfied that, whatever system of surveillance is adopted, there 
exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse. This assessment has 
only a relative character: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, 
such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, the 
grounds required for ordering such measures, the authorities competent to 
permit, carry out and supervise such measures, and the kind of remedy pro-
vided by the national law.33 
                                                                                                                                        
(2007); Ass‟n for Eur. Integration and Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 62540/00, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 71 (2007); Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
¶¶ 59-62 (2008); S. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 30562/04,  Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 95 (2008); 
Bykov v. Russia, App. No. 4378/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 76 (2009); Iordachi v. Moldova, 
App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 37-39 (2009). 
30 See cases cited supra note 29. 
31 Khan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35394/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 26 (2000) (quot-
ing Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 ¶ 67 (1984)).  
32 Klass, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 214 ¶ 49. 
33 Id. ¶ 50. 
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The Court then found a number of legal limitations to be in accor-
dance with Article 8 of the ECHR.  In the German legislation at stake, 
privacy-restricting measures were confined to cases in which there were 
factual indications for suspecting a person of planning, committing, or 
having committed, certain serious criminal acts.  Among other require-
ments, the application of the measures was limited by a subsidiarity 
clause, and even then the surveillance could cover only the specific sus-
pect or his presumed contact-persons.  Exploratory or general surveil-
lance was not permitted by the contested legislation.  Under the same 
legislation, the Court found that surveillance could be ordered only on 
written application giving reasons, and such an application could be 
made only by the head, or his substitute, of certain services.
34
  Accor-
dingly, “there exist[ed] an administrative procedure designed to ensure 
that measures were not ordered haphazardly, irregularly or without due 
and proper consideration.”35 
Starting with Klass at the end of the 1970s, the Court has steadily 
outlined a number of general principles regarding State responsibility re-
garding secret surveillance measures.  In recent cases, the Court has 
grown more exigent on the quality of the law, emphasizing its effective-
ness in practice, rather than its theoretical merits.  For example, the Court 
determined in the 2000 Rotaru case against Romania that although data 
on citizens may be gathered, recorded and archived, the kind of informa-
tion gathered has to be defined, as well as the categories of people that 
may be subjected to it, the circumstances that warrant surveillance, and 
the procedure that needs to be followed.
36
  The framework in existence 
and its application at the time was deemed largely incomplete.
37
 
Overall, the Court, through its case-law on secret measures of sur-
veillance, has developed a set of minimum safeguards that should be sta-
tutorily introduced in order to avoid abuses of power.  The safeguards 
should include: the nature of the offenses that may give rise to a surveil-
lance order; categories of people liable to be subject to any such meas-
ure; a limit on its duration; the procedure to be followed for examining; 
using and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken when 
communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which 
recordings may or must be erased or destroyed.
38
  Finally, “the body is-
                                                             
34 Id. ¶ 51. 
35 Id. 
36 See Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 449  ¶¶ 57-58 (2000). 
37 Id. ¶¶ 62-63. 
38 Iordachi v. Moldova, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (2009) (quoting We-
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suing authorizations should be independent and there must be either a 
form of judicial control, or control by an independent body over the is-
suing body‟s activity.”39 
With regard to who should design that legal framework, the ECtHR 
noted that:  
Since the implementation in practice of measures of secret surveillance of 
communications is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned or the 
public at large, it would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal discre-
tion granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an unfettered pow-
er. Consequently, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion 
conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with 
sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in 
question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary inter-
ference.40 
The Venice Commission reached the same conclusion, stating: 
[T]he regulation of internal security services can only be made effective by 
having specific legislation. If the position is regulated by administrative 
practice, however well adhered to, it will never provide the guarantees re-
quired by law. Being an administrative practice, it can be changed at any 
time and thereby clarity as to the scope or the manner in which the discre-
tion of the authorities is exercised would undoubtedly be lacking.41 
 3.     Control of Surveillance 
The Venice Commission concluded that legislative control over the 
                                                                                                                                        
ber, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 95). See Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84, Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 34 
(1990); Kruslin v. France, App. No. 11801/85, Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 35 (1990). 
39 Iordachi, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 40 (quoting Dumitru Popescu, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 70-73); see Valenzuela Contreras v. Spain, App. No. 27671/95, 28 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 483 ¶ 46 (1998); Ass‟n for Eur. Integration and Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 
62540/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 76-77 (2007); Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (2008). 
40 Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 68 (1984); 
Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 51 (1987); Amann v. Switzer-
land, App. No. 27798/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 56 (2000); Rotaru, App. No. 28341/95, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 55 (2000); Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 
(2008). The Court pointed out the same for delegation to the judiciary. See Huvig v. 
France, App. No. 11105/84, Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 29 (1990); Kruslin v. France, App. No. 
11801/85, Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 30 (1990); Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00,  Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 93 (2006); Bykov v. Russia, App. No. 4378/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 78 (2009); Iorda-
chi, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 39 (quoting Weber, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 94). 
41 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 20. 
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actions of intelligence services remains an essential means of ensuring 
that they operate exclusively in the national interest for the realization of 
democracy and the rule of law.
42
  Important issues are: an actor's compe-
tence to exercise that control (Infra Part a); the way the control process 
should be conducted before and during the surveillance measure (Infra 
Part b); and possibilities of a citizen to question the legality of a surveil-
lance measure afterwards (Infra Part c). 
a.  Control Actors 
In general, the European Court considers that in a field where abuse 
is potentially so easy and could have such harmful consequences for 
democratic society, it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory con-
trol to a judge.
43
  The Venice Commission equally promotes judicial con-
trol.
44
  The rights of individuals cannot be adequately protected if the acts 
of such institutions are not made susceptible to judicial review. 
[W]hereas it would be unrealistic to require their activities – if they are to 
be effective – to be fully transparent at all times, it is, however, expected 
that internal security services be accountable for their acts and activities 
within the legal framework in which they operate. To that extent they must 
be transparent in the sense that their actions should be verifiable and sub-
ject to control to establish whether they had correctly exercised their func-
tions and powers intra vires. This control must be a judicial one either by 
an ad hoc judicial authority, or by the ordinary courts. This is especially so 
where fundamental rights are involved.45 
Nevertheless, the European Court admitted that control can take other 
forms.  A parliamentary board or a specific supervisory commission in-
dependent of the authorities carrying out the surveillance, and “vested 
with sufficient powers and competence to exercise an effective and con-
tinuous control,” are acceptable as well.  The Court emphasized its dem-
ocratic character, “which can be reflected in a balanced membership of 
the parliamentary board.”  In those circumstances, such supervisory bo-
dies may “be regarded as enjoying sufficient independence to give an ob-
jective ruling.”46  In the Leander case of 1987, the Court repeated that it: 
[A]ttaches particular importance to the presence of parliamentarians on the 
                                                             
42 Id. at 6. 
43 Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 214 ¶ 56 (1980). 
44 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 11-13. 
45 Id. at 25. 
46 Klass, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 56. 
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National Police Board. . . . The parliamentary members of the board, who 
include members of the Opposition, participate in all decisions regarding 
whether or not information should be released to the requesting authority. 
In particular, each of them is vested with a right of veto, the exercise of 
which automatically prevents the Board from releasing the information . . . 
. This direct and regular control over the most important aspect of the regis-
ter – the release of information – provides a major safeguard against 
abuse.47  
The Venice Commission on its turn noticed the existence of supplemen-
tal parliamentary supervision.
48
 
An overall control over the system of secret surveillance being en-
trusted to the executive, such as the Minister of Internal Affairs, and not 
to independent bodies, is not acceptable to the Court.
49
  In its policy ob-
servations, the Venice Commission also found that internal security or-
gans are normally supervised by their hierarchical superiors, at the top 
level by the appropriate government Minister or even by the Prime Mi-
nister or the Head of State.  “The supervision often includes regular re-
ports from the security services.  It may even include the need for a su-
pervising person or body to authorize the commencement of 
investigations in individual cases.”50  Nevertheless, fundamental free-
doms can never be properly guaranteed if domestic security surveillances 
are conducted within the absolute discretion of the executive: 
It is an established fact that where there is unreviewed executive discretion 
this may very well lead to imposing pressure in order to obtain incriminat-
ing evidence and thereby overlook potential invasions of privacy. Thus, the 
services cannot operate uncontrolled. There have been various instances 
where security services have attempted to influence the political scene in 
the countries in which they operate.51 
b.  A Priori and Ad Hoc Control 
Review of surveillance may intervene at three stages: when the sur-
veillance is first ordered, while it is being carried out, or after it has been 
                                                             
47 Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 ¶ 65 (1987). 
48 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 14. 
49 Ass‟n for Eur. Integration and Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 62540/00, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 87 (2007). 
50 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 14. 
51 Venice Commission Report, supra note 2, at 20. 
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terminated. The Court stated that in the first two stages, the very nature 
and logic of secret surveillance dictate that the surveillance and the ac-
companying review should take place without the individual‟s know-
ledge: 
Consequently, since the individual will necessarily be prevented from seek-
ing an effective remedy of his own accord or from taking a direct part in 
any review proceedings, it is essential that the procedures established 
should themselves provide adequate and equivalent guarantees safeguard-
ing the individual‟s rights. In addition, the values of a democratic society 
must be followed as faithfully as possible in the supervisory procedures if 
the bounds of necessity, within the meaning of Article 8(2), are not to be 
exceeded.52 
According to the Court, the rule of law implies that an interference with 
an individual‟s rights by the executive authorities should be subject to an 
effective control, assured by the judiciary – at least in the last resort.  
Judicial control offers the best guarantee of independence, impartiality, 
and a proper procedure.
53
  In the analysis of the Venice Commission, the 
fact that many intelligence gathering actions are carried out clandestine-
ly, makes it impractical to rely on judicial control at the initiative of the 
person who has been the target of an operation of the security services.
54
  
The Venice Commission stated further: 
As such a judicial control could be seen as a vital safeguard of the rights of 
the individual, it might be advisable to make a recommendation that opera-
tions of the security services that involve intrusions into rights and free-
doms protected by the Constitution or the European Convention on Human 
Rights can only be carried out under judicial control.55 
c. A Posteriori Control 
The Venice Commission observed with regard to a posteriori con-
trol that a proper balance must be struck between the interests of the in-
dividual and the interests of society at large.  As an overriding principle: 
[T]he courts should have jurisdiction to determine whether the actions 
complained of were within the powers and functions of the internal security 
                                                             
52 Klass, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 55. 
53 Rotaru v. Romania, App. No. 28341/95, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 449 ¶ 59 (2000). In the 
Antunes Rocha case, the Court reiterated this idea, omitting however the reference to the 
judiciary as key player. Antunes Rocha v. Portugal, App. No. 64330/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 
76 (2005). 
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services as established by law. Within the limitations laid down by law, the 
court should have the right to determine whether there was undue harass-
ment of the individual or abuse of administrative discretion in his or her re-
gard. Judicial review of the executive acts, even with proper safeguards es-
sential in the circumstances to ensure the integrity of the State, should not 
be unduly withheld.56 
In the view of the ECtHR: 
[A]s regards review a posteriori, it is necessary to determine whether judi-
cial control, in particular with the individual‟s participation, should contin-
ue to be excluded even after surveillance has ceased. Inextricably linked to 
this issue is the question of subsequent notification, since there is in prin-
ciple little scope for recourse to the courts by the individual concerned un-
less he is advised of the measures taken without his knowledge and thus 
able retrospectively to challenge their legality.57 
One of the questions the Court already had to answer is whether it is 
feasible in practice to require subsequent notification in all cases.  Ob-
viously, the activity or danger against which a particular series of surveil-
lance measures is directed may continue after the suspension of those 
measures.  In the opinion of the Court, subsequent notification to each 
individual affected might well jeopardize the long-term purpose that 
originally prompted the surveillance.
58
  Furthermore, such notification 
might serve to reveal the working methods and fields of operation of the 
intelligence services and even possibly to identify their agents.  The con-
clusion of the Court in Klass was that not informing the individual once 
surveillance has ceased cannot itself be incompatible with Article 8 of 
the ECHR.
59
  However, in the 2008 Ekimdzhiev case the Court ruled that 
legislation excluding such notification in any case and at any time (for 
reasons of classification of information), is intolerable.
60
  Legislation ex-
cluding notification would mean that a target of surveillance may be un-
able to seek redress for unlawful interferences with the Article 8 rights; 
the person would not know that they had been monitored unless there 
was a leak of information or the person was subsequently prosecuted 
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57 Klass, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 57. 
58 Id. ¶ 58. 
59 Id. 
60 Ass‟n for Eur. Integration and Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 62540/00, 
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based on the gathered information.
61
 
C.  Measures Necessary in a Democratic Society 
In the context of national security measures, the second condition 
does not pose a problem; public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, the prevention of disorder or crime, and the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others are described in the Convention as legiti-
mate goals for a privacy intrusion.
62
  The measures, however, must also 
be necessary in today‟s democratic society.  The Court emphasized that, 
“while the Court recognizes that intelligence services may legitimately 
exist in a democratic society, it reiterates that powers of secret surveil-
lance of citizens are tolerable under the Convention only in so far as 
strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions.”
63
 
In accordance to settled case-law, an interference will be considered 
necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate aim if it answers a so-
called “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued, and if the reasons adduced by the national 
authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient.”
64
  The Venice 
Commission, having accepted that the unorthodox means by which inter-
nal security services must be allowed to operate can have a negative ef-
fect,
 65
 stated:  
[I]t is imperative that these extraordinary measures and restrictions of fun-
damental rights and liberties should be proportionate to the danger in-
volved. The same principle applies when the internal security services in-
tervene out of necessity in the defense of the State in the political or 
democratic process. These services are only authorized to intervene in this 
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manner as long as the danger their action is meant to prevent persists and 
with the minimum involvement for a definite and determinate purpose.66 
While the national authorities make the initial assessment in all 
these respects, the final evaluation of whether the interference is neces-
sary remains subject to review by the Court for conformity with the re-
quirements of the Convention.  A certain margin of appreciation is never-
theless left to the competent national authorities in this assessment.  The 
breadth of this margin varies, depending on a number of factors includ-
ing the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the in-
dividual, the nature of the interference and the object pursued by the in-
terference.  The margin will tend to be narrower where the right at stake 
is crucial to the individual‟s effective enjoyment of intimate or key 
rights.  Equally, where a particularly important facet of an individual‟s 
existence or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will be 
restricted.  "Where, however, there is no consensus within the Member 
States, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to 
how best to protect it, the margin will be wider."
67
 
Occasionally, the Court considers not only the qualitative aspects of 
legislation, but also statistical evidence, such as the amount of times a 
government has used secret investigation during a certain period of time 
in relation to its population numbers, how many of these actions were 
used in criminal proceedings afterwards, and so on.  For example, the 
Court noted in the Ekimdzhiev case that: 
[M]ore than 10,000 warrants were issued over a period of some twenty-four 
months, from 1 January 1999 to 1 January 2001, and that number does not 
even include the tapping of mobile telephones (for a population of less than 
8,000,000). Out of these, only 267 or 269 had subsequently been used in 
criminal proceedings . . . .  Additionally, in an interview published on 26 
January 2001 the then Minster of Internal Affairs conceded that he had 
signed 4,000 orders for the deployment of means of secret surveillance dur-
ing his thirteen months in office . . . .  By contrast, in Malone . . ., the num-
ber of the warrants issued was considered relatively low (400 telephone 
tapping warrants and less than 100 postal warrants annually during the pe-
riod 1969-79, for more than 26,428,000 telephone lines nationwide). These 
differences are telling, even if allowance is made for the development of 
the means of communication and the rise in terrorist activities in recent 
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years. They also show that the system of secret surveillance in Bulgaria is, 
to say the least, overused, which may in part be due to the inadequate safe-
guards which the law provides.
68
 
As mentioned above, the Court previously held with regard to secret sur-
veillance that national authorities enjoyed a fairly wide margin of apprec-
iation in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protect-
ing national security.
69
  The criteria concerning foreseeability, safeguards 
and control seem to indicate, however, that today this margin has become 
limited.  In some national security cases not relating to Article 8, the 
Court considers that there is no margin of appreciation at all.
70
 
 
IV.     SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES INTERFERING WITH THE 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
When it comes to privacy, it is inherent to the nature of the privacy 
reducing measures that national security may not have been affected yet.  
The government‟s goal is to prevent any actual threat of being carried 
out.  Obviously, any such danger to national security will have to be 
proven, or at least made credible, by facts. In what follows, a number of 
investigation techniques are examined in more detail.  These involve sys-
tematic or intensified observations (infra Part A), the interception and 
opening of mail correspondence (infra Part B), the identification, track-
ing and wiretapping of telecommunication (infra Part C), and the keep-
ing of data (infra Part D).  The last two techniques, to the application of 
which governments seem to be increasingly inclined, will be discussed 
with more attention.  As explained above, every State has its own legal 
framework to organize the competences of the actors concerned.  
A. Systematic or Intensified Observations 
Within the ECHR framework, the justifiability of intensified obser-
vations depends on what particular actions have been undertaken.  The 
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systematic retention of information regarding a person‟s whereabouts 
and doings must be in accordance with the abuse safeguards described 
above.  When observations are conducted (and the results stored) with 
some kind of technical equipment, the principles of communication taps 
or private information data banks may apply (infra Parts C and D).  Ob-
viously, physically searching private dwellings or property constitutes a 
serious interference with a person‟s private life, and a fortiori when the 
person concerned is unaware.  As always, the European Court attaches 
great importance to preceding judicial control.
71
  In the Murray case, the 
Court found that: 
[I]t remains to be determined whether [the searches] were necessary in a 
democratic society and, in particular, whether the means employed were 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In this connection it is not for 
the Court to substitute for the assessment of the national authorities its own 
assessment of what might be the best policy in the field of investigation of 
terrorist crime.
72
 
Thus, a certain margin of appreciation in deciding what measures to 
take both in general and in particular cases should be left to the national 
authorities.  The Court continued by reaffirming the responsibility of an 
elected government in a democratic society to protect its citizens and its 
institutions against the threats posed by organized terrorism and to the 
special problems involved in the arrest and detention of persons sus-
pected of terrorist-linked offenses.
73
  It opined that "[t]hese two factors 
affect the fair balance that is to be struck between the exercise by the in-
dividual of the right guaranteed to him or her under paragraph 1 of Ar-
ticle 8 and the necessity under paragraph 2 for the State to take effective 
measures for the prevention of terrorist crimes."
74
 
Since there existed evidence resulting in a genuine and honest 
suspicion that the applicant committed a terrorist linked crime, the 
Court in Murray accepted that it was reasonable under the circums-
tances to search the target‟s house.75  In general, the existence of 
specific legislation dealing with situations in which officers enter 
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private places without conducting a normal house search is appro-
priate.  With regard to cases involving the planting of electronic 
devices and the use of video cameras to observe the activities of 
persons in private places, the Venice Commission noted in 1998 
that the introduction of such legislation would ensure that, while 
the security services are provided with the necessary tools to gather 
information about serious crime and terrorism, they do not exceed 
their powers.
76
 
In any case, authorities will have to be careful, even when 
conducting observations in a public environment.  According to the 
ECtHR, there is a zone of interaction of a person with others, even 
in a public context, which may fall within the scope of private life.  
It cannot be ignored that a person‟s private life may extend outside 
a person‟s home or private premises.77  In the case of P.G. and J.H. 
v. United Kingdom, the Court added, however, that: 
Since there are occasions when people knowingly or intentionally involve 
themselves in activities which are or may be recorded or reported in a pub-
lic manner, a person‟s reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a sig-
nificant, although not necessarily conclusive, factor. A person who walks 
down the street will, inevitably, be visible to any member of the public who 
is also present. Monitoring by technological means of the same public 
scene (for example, a security guard viewing through closed circuit televi-
sion) is of a similar character.78 
B.  The Interception and Opening of Mail Correspondence 
Obviously, the Court has dealt with protection of correspondence 
problems.  In a national security context, it paid particular attention to the 
mail traffic between a prisoner and his attorney.  In Campbell, the Court 
found that the prison authorities may open a letter: 
[W]hen they have reasonable cause to believe that it contains an illicit en-
closure which the normal means of detection have failed to disclose. The 
letter should, however, only be opened and should not be read. Suitable 
guarantees preventing the reading of the letter should be provided, e.g. 
opening the letter in the presence of the prisoner. The reading of a prison-
er‟s mail to and from a lawyer, on the other hand, should only be permitted 
in exceptional circumstances when the authorities have reasonable cause to 
believe that the privilege is being abused in that the contents of the letter 
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endanger prison security or the safety of others or are otherwise of a crimi-
nal nature. What may be regarded as “reasonable cause” will depend on all 
the circumstances but it presupposes the existence of facts or information 
which would satisfy an objective observer that the privileged channel of 
communication was being abused.
79
 
In the Erdem case, the Court accepted that it is necessary in a democratic 
society, for reasons of national security, to monitor the correspondence 
of prisoners specifically suspected of belonging to a terrorist organiza-
tion.  The Court stressed that "the monitoring power was vested in an in-
dependent judge who had to be unconnected with the investigation and 
was under a duty to keep the information obtained confidential."
80
  For 
these reasons, the interference was considered falling in the margin of 
appreciation of the State.
81
  Having interception warrants issued by 
courts would, according to the Venice Commission, also serve to dismiss 
any objection to introducing the transcripts as admissible evidence in a 
prosecution case.
82
 
C.  Identification, Tracking and Wiretapping of Telecommunication 
Wiretapping is a very invasive investigation method because it al-
lows police officers to listen to citizens‟ private conversations.  It is no 
surprise that the issue has provoked a large number of applications to the 
Court, resulting in a rather differentiated analysis.  In the Klass case 
mentioned above, the Court noted the technical advances made in the 
field of espionage and, correspondingly, of surveillance.
83
  Most impor-
tantly, due to the development of terrorism in Europe in recent years, 
“democratic societies nowadays find themselves threatened by highly 
sophisticated forms of espionage and by terrorism, with the result that the 
State must be able, in order effectively to counter such threats, to under-
take the secret surveillance of subversive elements operating within its 
jurisdiction.”
84
 
For that reason, the Court accepted that the existence of legislation 
granting powers of secret surveillance of telecommunications is, under 
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exceptional conditions, a necessary evil.
85
  The domestic legislature en-
joys certain discretion; the Court does not consider itself to be a substi-
tute for the assessment by the national authorities of what might be the 
best policy. Nevertheless the Court stressed that: 
[T]his does not mean that the Contracting States enjoy an unlimited discre-
tion to subject persons within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance. The 
Court, being aware of the danger such a law poses of undermining or even 
destroying democracy on the ground of defending it, affirms that the Con-
tracting States may not, in the name of the struggle against espionage and 
terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.
86
 
The principles regulating telephone tapping apply equally to the use 
of radio-transmitting devices, which are, in terms of the nature and de-
gree of the intrusion involved, virtually identical to that of telephone tap-
ping.
87
  Not all telecom follow-ups, however, amount to such wiretap-
ping.  In the Malone case of 1984, the Court found that the registering of 
numbers dialed on a particular telephone, and the time and duration of 
each call by its very nature to be distinguished from the interception of 
communications, which is undesirable and illegitimate in a democratic 
society unless justified.
88
  Hence, the measures taken in order to prevent 
arbitrariness are not under the same scrutiny as in cases of the actual tap-
ping of conversations.  "The Court does not accept, however, that the use 
of that data . . . whatever the circumstances and purposes, cannot give 
rise to an issue under Article 8.”89  The retention and use of data will be 
further discussed below (cf. infra Part D). 
As a matter of principle, in the Huvig and Kruslin judgments of 
1990, the Court considered that “[t]apping and other forms of intercep-
tion of telephone conversations . . . must . . . be based on a „law‟ that is 
particularly precise.  It is essential to have clear, detailed rules on the 
subject, especially as the technology available for use is continually be-
coming more sophisticated.”90  The domestic law must be sufficiently 
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clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the cir-
cumstances in which, and the conditions on which, public authorities are 
empowered to resort to any measures.
91
  Nevertheless, and contrary to 
the legislation of some Member States, the proactive ordering of a tele-
phone tap (before any crime is committed) is not necessarily a violation 
of Article 8 of the ECHR.
92
  The Court noted in the Lüdi case that the tap 
was "aimed at the 'prevention of crime,'" and it had "no doubt as to its 
necessity in a democratic society."
93
  According to the Court, to assess 
the legitimacy of a wiretap, a distinction has to be made between two 
stages of interception: the authorization of the measure (infra Part 1) and 
the control during the surveillance process (infra Part 2).
94
 
1.      Wiretap authorization 
In the first stage, the following general conditions to justify secret 
surveillance must be fulfilled: (1) the applicable legislation should pro-
vide the nature of the offenses which may give rise to the tapping; (2) a 
definition of the categories of people possibly subject to the measure; (3) 
limits on its duration; (4) the procedure to be followed for examining, us-
ing and storing the data; (5) the precautions to be taken when communi-
cating the data to others; and (6) the circumstances in which recordings 
or tapes are erased or destroyed.
95
  In the context of telephone tapping, 
this means a definition of the categories of people liable to have their tel-
ephones tapped by judicial order and the nature of the offenses which 
                                                                                                                                        
Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (2009) (quoting Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 93 
(2006)). 
91 Iordachi, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (quoting Weber, App. No. 
54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 93); See Huvig, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528 ¶ 29; Kruslin, 12 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 547 ¶ 30; Kopp, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 91 ¶ 64; Khan v. United Kingdom, App. 
No. 35394/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 26 (2000) (quoting Malone, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 ¶ 67). 
92 The Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure, for example, does not allow it. Article 
53 of the ECHR provides that nothing in the Convention “shall be construed as limiting 
or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be en-
sured under the laws of any High Contracting Party . . . .” As a consequence of this max-
imization clause, in principle, the more protective framework will be applied. 
93 Lüdi v. Switzerland, App. No. 12433/86, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 173 ¶ 39 (1992). 
94 Iordachi, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 41; see also Ass‟n for Eur. Integra-
tion & Human Rights v. Bulgaria, App. No. 62540/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 84 (2007). 
95 Huvig, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528 ¶ 34; Kruslin, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 547 ¶ 35; Valenzu-
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may give rise to such an order.  The absence of an obligation to set a lim-
it on the duration of telephone tapping, specifications of the procedure 
for creating the interception reports, and of the “precautions to be taken 
in order to communicate the recordings intact and in their entirety for 
possible inspection by the judge and by the defence,” is considered prob-
lematic.
96
  According to the Court, “[t]he requirement that the effects of 
the 'law' [should] be foreseeable means, in the sphere of monitoring tele-
phone communications, that the guarantees stating the extent of the au-
thorities‟ discretion and the manner in which it is to be exercised must be 
set out in detail in domestic law so that it has a binding force which cir-
cumscribes the judges‟ discretion in the application of such measures.”97 
Indeed, the Court stresses the value of a decision by an investigating 
judge or, for example, by the president of the indictment division of the 
court, who is an independent judicial authority.
98
  Interceptions ordered 
only by the public prosecution, without any a priori control possibility 
by a judge, do not meet the required standards of independence.
99
  “[T]he 
Court considers it [equally] necessary to stress that telephone tapping is a 
very serious interference with a person‟s rights and that only very serious 
reasons based on a reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in se-
rious criminal activity should be taken as a basis for authorising it.”100  
The Venice Commission advised the same stating that a wiretap should 
only be installed when the judge is satisfied that there is imminent danger 
of a serious crime and that more routine methods of investigation would 
be unlikely to succeed.
101
  Provisions should be made for the transcripts 
to be handed first to the judge, who then releases to the investigating ser-
vices the portions that he deems relevant to the investigations being car-
ried out.
102
  As it appears, the so-called “John Doe” taps provided for in 
section 206 of the U.S. Patriot Act (expired in principle in 2009), being 
anonymous regarding either the person or the place monitored, would not 
meet the requirements of the European Court.  Its accordance with the 4
th
 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution can, in fact, equally be questioned. 
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2.      Wiretap Control 
With regard to the second stage, control over the surveillance 
should be put under control of a judge or another independent body.
103
  
In the total absence of any effective judicial control policies, the Court is 
not impressed by a (theoretical) resort to Parliament.
104
  An investigating 
judge whose role is limited to issuing interception warrants and deciding 
on the storage of the tapes and transcripts is not enough if the law fails to 
make a provision for acquainting him with the results of the surveillance, 
and does not require him to determine if the requirements of the law have 
been complied with.  Leaving that competence to the prosecutor‟s office 
is not sufficient, certainly not considering that the situations protected 
would then only be those attached to criminal proceedings, neglecting 
any surveillance outside of that scope.
105
  Delegating the task to draft the 
reports of the monitored conversations to a judicial clerk is equally insuf-
ficient.
106
  The Court noted that, with regard to the “thoroughness,” that:  
[D]ans certaines circonstances, il soit excessif, ne serait-ce que d'un point 
de vue pratique, de transcrire et de verser au dossier d'instruction d'une af-
faire la totalité des conversations interceptées à partir d'un poste télépho-
nique. Cela pourrait certes aller à l'encontre d'autres droits, tel, par 
exemple, le droit au respect de la vie privée d'autres personnes qui ont pas-
sé des appels à partir du poste mis sous écoute. Si tel est le cas, l'intéressé 
doit néanmoins se voir offrir la possibilité d'écouter les enregistrements ou 
de contester leur véracité, d'où la nécessité de les garder intacts jusqu'à la 
fin du procès pénal, et, plus généralement, de verser au dossier d'instruction 
les pièces qui lui semblent pertinentes pour la défense de ses intérêts.107 
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The Court has also given attention to the circumstances in which record-
ings may or must be erased or destroyed, in particular, where an accused 
has been discharged by an investigating judge or acquitted by a court.
108
  
D.   The Keeping of Data 
In the Leander judgment, the ECtHR stated that: 
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting na-
tional security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the compe-
tent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers not 
accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this 
information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in 
posts of importance for national security.109 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that private-life considerations may 
arise once any systematic or permanent record comes into existence of 
such material from the public domain. Other than the techniques dis-
cussed above, it is not always self-evident whether the keeping of data 
amounts to a privacy interference (infra Part 1). Once an interference is 
established, the question is whether it can be justified under Article 8 of 
the ECHR (infra Part 2). 
 1.    The Existence of an Interference 
Nowadays, data can take a multitude of forms: not only plain bio-
graphic information on an individual‟s identity, but also photographic 
material, video or voice recordings, finger prints, DNA or cellular ma-
terial.  The question is whether the gathering of data on a person amounts 
to an interference with Article 8 of the ECHR in all circumstances. 
In the Friedl case, which involved the use of photographs taken by 
the authorities during a public demonstration, the European Commission 
for Human Rights
110
 noted that there was no intrusion into the inner cir-
                                                                                                                                        
ings, and, more in general, to include the pieces that look suitable to him for the defense 
of his interests into the preliminary investigation file.” Id.  (translated by author). 
108 Huvig v. France, App. No. 11105/84, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528 ¶ 34 (1990); Kruslin 
v. France, App. No. 11801/85, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 547 ¶ 35 (1990); Valenzuela Contreras 
v. Spain, App. No. 27671/95, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 483 ¶ 46 (1999); Iordachi, App. No. 
25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 39 (quoting Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. ¶ 95 (2006)). 
109 Leander v. Sweden, App. No. 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433 ¶ 59 (1987). 
110 Until the adoption of the 11th Protocol additional to the ECHR individual com-
plaints were first assessed by an accessory organ to the Court. It was abolished in 1998. 
SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES, DATA PROCESSING AND 
PRIVACY PROTECTION IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 125 
cle of the applicant‟s private life.
111
  The photographs were taken of a 
public demonstration and they had been used solely as an aid to police 
the demonstration on the relevant day.
112
  In this context, the Commis-
sion gave weight to the fact that the photographs taken remained ano-
nymous, the personal data recorded and the photographs were not en-
tered into a data-processing system, and no action had been taken to 
identify the persons photographed on that occasion by means of data 
processing.
113
  In Lupker, equally concerning photographs, the Commis-
sion observed first that they were not taken in a way which constituted an 
intrusion upon the applicants‟ privacy; second, that the photographs were 
kept in police archives since they had been either provided voluntarily or 
taken by police in connection with a previous arrest; and third, that the 
photo‟s “were used solely for the purpose of the identification of the of-
fenders in the criminal proceedings against the applicants and there is no 
suggestion that they have been made available to the general public or 
used for any other purpose.”
114
 
Also, the monitoring of the actions of an individual in a public place 
by the use of photographic equipment which does not record the visual 
data does not, as such, give rise to an interference with the individual‟s 
private life.
115
  In those cases, the question whether privacy was violated 
was not even asked – government action did not amount to a privacy is-
sue. 
The storing and releasing of information from a secret police file 
without opportunity to refute it is, however, considered an interfe-
rence.
116
  Furthermore, the Court was not persuaded that recordings taken 
for use as voice samples could be regarded as falling outside the scope of 
the protection afforded by Article 8, since a permanent record has “been 
made of the person‟s voice and it is subject to a process of analysis di-
rectly relevant to identifying that person in the context of other personal 
data.”117  Equally, a card containing data relating to an individual‟s pri-
vate life that is being stored in a national card index has been considered 
an interference.  In that case, the Court pointed out that it was not its job 
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to speculate as to whether the information gathered is sensitive or not, 
nor as to whether the individual has been inconvenienced in any way.  It 
is sufficient to conclude that where data relating to the private life of an 
individual is stored by a public authority, the measure amounted to an 
interference with Article 8 protection.
118
 
With regard to fingerprints, the Court reassessed existing case-law 
established in the 2008 landmark case S. and Marper.  In the past, the 
Commission concluded that fingerprints were neutral, identifying fea-
tures and therefore did not contain any subjective appreciations.  As 
such, the retention of that material did not constitute an interference with 
private life.
119
  The Court now concluded that the general approach with 
respect to photographs and voice samples should also be followed with 
respect to fingerprints.  Fingerprints objectively contain unique informa-
tion about the individual concerned, allowing for his or her identification 
with precision, in a wide range of circumstances.  They are thus capable 
of affecting private life and retention of this information, without the 
consent of the individual concerned, cannot be regarded as neutral or in-
significant.  Accordingly, the Court considered that the retention of fin-
gerprints in the authorities‟ records in connection with an identified or 
identifiable individual may in itself give rise, notwithstanding their ob-
jective and irrefutable character, to important private-life concerns.
120
 
Today, in a time when many States across the world tend to syste-
matically keep biometrical data on people, the question of what status 
should be given to cellular and DNA material is highly important.  With 
regard to the keeping of that type of information, the S. and Marper 
judgment declared that this amounts to an interference with the right to 
privacy.
121
 
[A]n individual‟s concern about the possible future use of private informa-
tion retained by the authorities is legitimate and relevant to a determination 
of the issue of whether there has been an interference. Indeed, bearing in 
mind the rapid pace of developments in the field of genetics and informa-
tion technology, the Court cannot discount the possibility that in the future 
the private-life interests bound up with genetic information may be ad-
versely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be anticipated 
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with precision today.122 
The Court noted, however, that a legitimate concern about the conceiva-
ble use of cellular material in the future is not the only element to be tak-
en into account.  In addition to the highly personal nature of cellular 
samples, they contain sensitive information about an individual, includ-
ing information about his or her health, and, moreover, samples contain a 
unique genetic code of great relevance to both the individual and his rela-
tives.
123
 
DNA profiles contain a more limited amount of personal informa-
tion in a coded form.  Nonetheless, the profiles contain substantial 
amounts of unique personal data.  While that information may be consi-
dered objective and irrefutable, processing the data through automated 
means allows the authorities to go well beyond neutral identification.  “In 
the Court‟s view, the DNA profiles‟ capacity to provide a means of iden-
tifying genetic relationships between individuals . . . is in itself sufficient 
to conclude that their retention interferes with the right to the private 
lives of the individuals concerned.”124  The frequency of familial 
searches, the safeguards attached thereto, and the likelihood of detriment 
in a particular case were found immaterial in this respect.  The conclu-
sion was similarly not affected because the information is in coded form.  
The Court concluded that "[t]he possibility the DNA profiles create for 
inferences to be drawn as to ethnic origin, makes their retention all the 
more sensitive and susceptible of affecting the right to private life."
125
 
2.     Justifiability of an Interference 
In order to maintain such databases, the conditions of the second pa-
ragraph of Article 8 will have to be fulfilled; any interference should be 
prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate goal, and be necessary in a demo-
cratic society.  As stated in the Rotaru case (supra), for the measures to 
be in accordance with the law, the Court reiterated: 
[T]hat it is as essential, in this context, as in telephone tapping, secret sur-
veillance and covert intelligence-gathering, to have clear, detailed rules go-
verning the scope and application of measures, as well as minimum safe-
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guards concerning, inter alia, duration, storage, usage, access of third par-
ties, procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data and 
procedures for its destruction, thus providing sufficient guarantees against 
the risk of abuse and arbitrariness.126 
The fact that the keeping of this information can serve a legitimate aim is 
not an issue.  The Court had no difficulty in accepting that the compila-
tion and retention of a DNA profile serves the legitimate aims of the pre-
vention of crime and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
This is not altered by the fact that DNA plays no role in the investigation 
and trial of the offences committed by an applicant.  Furthermore, the 
Court did "not consider it unreasonable for the obligation to undergo 
DNA testing to be imposed on all persons who have been convicted of 
offences of a certain seriousness."
127
 
The question remains as to whether it is necessary in a democratic 
society to use DNA collection in certain situations.  The Court found it to 
be beyond dispute that the fight against crime, and in particular against 
organized crime and terrorism, depends to a great extent on the use of 
modern scientific techniques of investigation and identification; nor is it 
disputed that the Member States have made rapid and marked progress in 
using DNA information in the determination of innocence or guilt.
128
  
Furthermore, the applicant may also reap a certain benefit from the inclu-
sion of his DNA profile in the national database in that he may thereby 
be rapidly eliminated from the list of persons suspected of crimes in the 
investigation of which material containing DNA has been found.
129
  In 
the S. and Marper case, the Court emphasized nevertheless that it cannot 
limit itself to an assessment in abstracto of the technique:  
While it recognizes the importance of such information in the detection of 
crime, the Court must delimit the scope of its examination. The question is 
not whether the retention of fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA pro-
files may in general be regarded as justified under the Convention. The on-
ly issue to be considered by the Court is whether the retention of the fin-
gerprint and DNA data of the applicants, as persons who had been 
suspected, but not convicted, of certain criminal offences, was justified un-
der article 8, paragraph 2 of the Convention.130 
According to the Court, the core principles of data protection require the 
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retention of data to be proportionate in relation to the purpose of collec-
tion and insist on limited periods of storage.
131
  More particularly, most 
of the Member States allow cellular samples to be taken in criminal pro-
ceedings only from individuals suspected of having committed offenses 
of a certain minimum gravity.  The Court noted that in the great majority 
of the States with functioning DNA databases, samples and DNA pro-
files derived from those samples are required to be removed or destroyed 
either immediately, or within a certain limited time after acquittal or dis-
charge, although a restricted number of exceptions to this principle is al-
lowed by some States.
132
 
The Court remarked that the protection afforded by Article 8 of the 
ECHR would be unacceptably weakened if the use of modern scientific 
techniques in the criminal justice system were allowed at any cost.  “In 
the Court‟s view, the strong consensus existing among the [Member] 
States in this respect is of considerable importance and narrows the mar-
gin of appreciation left to the State in the assessment of the permissible 
limits of the interference with private life.”133  This leads one to ask: can 
there be relevant and sufficient reasons for the permanent retention of 
fingerprint and DNA data of all suspected, but not convicted, people?  
In S. and Marper, the Court accepted that the extension of the data-
base had contributed to the detection and prevention of crime, despite the 
fact that there was no evidence at that time establishing that the success-
ful identification and prosecution of offenders “could not have been 
achieved without the permanent and indiscriminate retention of the fin-
gerprint and DNA records of all persons in the applicants‟ position.”134 
The question, however, remained whether such retention is proportionate 
and strikes a fair balance between the competing public and private in-
terests.  In this respect, the Court rejects a blanket and indiscriminate 
power of retention: 
The material may be retained irrespective of the nature or gravity of the of-
fence with which the individual was originally suspected or of the age of 
the suspected offender; fingerprints and samples may be taken – and re-
tained – from a person of any age, arrested in connection with a recordable 
offence, which includes minor or non-imprisonable offences. The retention 
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is not time-limited; the material is retained indefinitely whatever the nature 
or seriousness of the offence of which the person was suspected. Moreover, 
there exist only limited possibilities for an acquitted individual to have the 
data removed from the nationwide database or the materials destroyed . . .; 
in particular, there is no provision for independent review of the justifica-
tion for the retention according to defined criteria, including such factors as 
the seriousness of the offence, previous arrests, the strength of the suspi-
cion against the person and any other special circumstances.135 
The Court acknowledged that the level of interference with the appli-
cants‟ right to private life may be different depending on the category of 
personal data retained.  For example, the retention of cellular samples is 
particularly intrusive given the wealth of genetic and health information 
contained therein.  However, such an indiscriminate and open-ended re-
tention regime as the one in issue called for careful scrutiny regardless of 
these differences.
136
  The risk of stigmatization, as the Court emphasized, 
is of particular concern.  The perception that persons involved are not be-
ing treated as innocent is heightened by the fact that data are retained in-
definitely in the same way as the data of convicted persons, while the da-
ta of those who have never been suspected of an offense are required to 
be destroyed.
137
  The Court finally considered that the retention of the 
unconvicted persons‟ data may be especially harmful in the case of mi-
nors, given their special situation and the importance of their develop-
ment and integration into society.
138
  It concluded that “[a]ccordingly, the 
retention at issue constitutes a disproportionate interference with the ap-
plicants‟ right to respect for private life and cannot be regarded as neces-
sary in a democratic society.”139 
V.  SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES INTERFERING WITH THE 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
It is clear that the application of certain special investigation tech-
niques cannot only give cause to violations of an individual‟s privacy, 
but it may also touch upon other fundamental rights, including the right 
to a fair trial.  The European Court does not accept that Article 6, which 
guarantees due process, has no application to pre-trial proceedings.  Its 
requirements may be relevant before a case is sent for trial, because the 
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fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure 
to afford such rights.
140
  Often, the question about the admissibility dur-
ing trial of the information previously obtained, is linked.  The European 
Court is, in principle, reluctant to make a judgment about particular evi-
dentiary issues when examining an alleged violation of Article 6 of the 
ECHR.  It holds that the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter to 
be regulated by national law, and as a general rule, it is for the national 
courts to assess the evidence before them:  “The Court‟s task is rather to 
ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which 
evidence was taken, were fair.”
141
  Overall, as it will appear, there is a 
certain leniency towards due process restrictions when national security 
is at stake.  But it is limited, and including within the Court, not uncon-
troversial.  Below, the technique of infiltration (infra Part A), and the 
keeping of observation and infiltration data in confidential records (infra 
Part B), will be discussed more profoundly. 
A.  Infiltration 
For police to perform their task, they are increasingly required to 
make use of undercover agents, informers, and covert practices, particu-
larly in tackling organized crime and corruption.  That special investiga-
tion technique is essentially of a deceptive nature.  The European Court 
noted in this regard that the use of special investigative methods – in par-
ticular, undercover techniques – cannot in itself infringe the right to a fair 
trial.
142
  However, on account of the risk of police incitement entailed by 
such techniques, their use must be kept within clear limits, as will be 
shown below.  
In the Lüdi case, the Court found, first of all, that the sending of an 
undercover agent into what was thought to be a large criminal network 
did not interfere with the right to privacy of the suspects.  A suspect who 
is aware that he is engaged in a criminal act, should equally be aware that 
                                                             
140 Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, App. No. 13972/88, Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 ¶ 36 (1993) 
(internal citation omitted). 
141 See, e.g., Ramanauskas v. Lithuania, App. No. 74420/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. 119 ¶ 52 
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he is consequently running the risk of encountering an undercover police 
officer whose task, is in fact, to expose him.
143
  Regarding fair trial rights 
however, the use of undercover agents must be restricted and safeguards 
put in place. Crucial in Lüdi was the determination that the police officer 
concerned had been sworn in, the investigating judge had not been una-
ware of his mission, and the authorities had opened a preliminary inves-
tigation.
144
   
By doing so, the police officers‟ role is confined to acting as an un-
dercover agent.  The fact that the authorities have “good reason to sus-
pect” the defendant of having a propensity to commit an offense would 
tend to suggest that an operation is more akin to “infiltration” than “in-
stigation.”  That was not the case in the case of Teixeira de Castro.  As 
there was no government evidence to support that the applicant was pre-
disposed to commit offenses, the Court concluded that “the police offic-
ers did not confine themselves to investigating Mr. Teixeira de Castro‟s 
criminal activity in an essentially passive manner, but exercised an influ-
ence such as to incite the commission of the offence.”145 In the Court‟s 
opinion, the right to a fair administration of justice holds such a promi-
nent place that it cannot be sacrificed for the sake of expedience.146 Fol-
lowing the principles established in Teixeira, the Ramanauskas case, for 
example, held that “the public interest cannot justify the use of evidence 
obtained as a result of police incitement, as to do so would expose the 
accused to the risk of being definitively deprived of a fair trial from the 
outset.”147 
In that circumstance, suspicion must be based on concrete evidence 
showing that initial steps have been taken to commit the acts constituting 
the offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted.  The 
Court holds that police officers act only as undercover agents if signifi-
cant steps preparatory to the commission of the offense had been taken 
before their participation in the investigation.
148
  The Court also checks 
“whether there is evidence indicating that, without such intervention, the 
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offence would not have been committed.”149  In any event, it is up to the 
prosecution to prove that there was no incitement, provided that the de-
fendant‟s allegations are not wholly improbable.  In the absence of any 
such proof, it is the task of the judicial authorities to examine the facts of 
the case and to take the necessary steps to uncover the truth in order to 
determine whether there was any incitement.  For the trial to be fair with-
in the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR, “all evidence obtained as a re-
sult of police incitement must be excluded.”150 
B.  The Inaccessibility of a Confidential Record 
The confidentiality of records holding information obtained through 
special investigation techniques is obviously a delicate matter.  It is a 
fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that criminal proceedings 
are adversarial and that there is equality of arms between the prosecution 
and the defense.  The right to an adversarial trial means, in a criminal 
case, that both parties must have the opportunity to know and comment 
on the evidence discovered.  In addition, Article 6 of the ECHR requires 
that the prosecution authorities disclose to the defense all material evi-
dence in their possession for or against the accused.  However, “the en-
titlement to disclosure of relevant evidence is not an absolute right. In 
any criminal proceedings there may be competing interests, such as na-
tional security or the need to protect witnesses at risk of reprisals or to 
keep secret police methods of investigating crime, which must be 
weighed against the rights of the accused.”
151
 
In some cases it may be necessary to withhold certain evidence 
from the defense so as to preserve the fundamental rights of another in-
dividual or to safeguard an important public interest.  Nevertheless, only 
measures restricting the rights of the defense which are strictly necessary 
are permissible under Article 6.  “[I]n order to ensure that the accused 
receives a fair trial, any difficulties caused to the defence by a limitation 
on its rights must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures fol-
                                                             
149 Eurofinacom, App. No. 58753/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004) (internal citation omit-
ted). 
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lowed by the judicial authorities.”
152
 
The European Court considers that a procedure whereby the prose-
cution itself attempts to assess the importance of concealed information 
for the defense and weighs this against the public interest in keeping the 
information secret, cannot comply with the requirements of Article 6 of 
the ECHR.
153
  It is important that material relevant to the defense be 
placed before the trial judge for his ruling on questions of disclosure at 
the time when it can serve most effectively to protect the rights of the de-
fense.
154
  In the Jasper case, the Court found that it was sufficient that 
the trial judge, with full knowledge of the issues in the trial, carried out 
the balancing exercise between the public interest in maintaining the con-
fidentiality of the evidence, and the need of the defendant to have it re-
vealed.  The Court was satisfied that the defending party was kept in-
formed and permitted to make submissions and participate in the 
decision-making process, as far as was possible without revealing to 
them the material which the prosecution sought to keep secret on public 
interest grounds.
155
  
Similarly, the Court determined in the Rowe and Davis case that a 
procedure before an appellate court about the disclosure of information 
was in itself not necessarily sufficient to remedy the unfairness during 
the trial by the absence of the scrutiny of information withheld by the tri-
al judge.
156
  Appellate judges' understanding of the possible relevance of 
the undisclosed material is sometimes dependent upon transcripts of 
hearings, and on the account of the issues given to them by prosecution.  
The first-instance judge is in a position to monitor the need for disclosure 
throughout the trial, assessing the importance of the undisclosed evi-
dence at a stage when new issues are still emerging.  “In contrast, the 
Court of Appeal was obliged to carry out its appraisal ex post facto.”157 
In the Edwards and Lewis case however, the Court drew the oppo-
site conclusion with regard to the capacity of the trial judge.  It appeared 
to the Court that the undisclosed evidence related, or might have related, 
to an issue of fact decided by the trial judge (the applicants alleged that 
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they had been the victim of police incitement).
158
  As they were denied 
access, it was impossible for the defense representatives to argue the case 
in full.  The judge had already seen prosecution evidence which might 
have been relevant to the issue: it was the same judge that had to assess 
the necessity of secrecy who judged the case on the merits afterwards.  
His appraisal of the evidence was essential to determine whether the 
prosecution could continue, and whether not disclosing it to the defense 
violated their right to a fair trial.
159
 
VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Although it may be clear that striking a balance between national 
security and privacy interests of individual citizens is not an easy exer-
cise, the European Court of Human Rights considers the efforts of Mem-
ber States of the Council of Europe to live up to a number of principles 
particularly important.  The Court‟s conclusions on the merits in all the 
above mentioned cases insisted on legal certainty; continuous control by 
independent (judicial) actors; a subsidiary deployment of very invasive 
measures for the benefit of others; less intrusive techniques; and propor-
tionality of the interference with one‟s privacy or due process rights to 
the goals government seeks to defend.  Particularly the latter condition 
may stay the pivotal point in the Court‟s decision-making for many years 
to come, as the proportionality requirement is a primary criterion in de-
termining whether human rights interference can be considered “neces-
sary in a democratic society.”  That is not all self-evident. Some of the 
junior Member States in Eastern Europe have had an authoritarian re-
gime for decades. Many of the cases discussed above show that often, 
their legal system is still adapting to the democratic standards set out by 
the Council of Europe.
160
 Nevertheless, no senior Member should as-
sume that its intelligence framework is perfect as is. 
It can be expected that in 21
st
 century democracies, privacy issues 
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will remain a prominent legal issue.  In contrast to questions of privacy 
concerning what we do while at work, on the internet or within our 
homes, when confronted with national security issues, it may be tempting 
to conclude that intrusive government measures should be allowed, since 
the greater good concerns our collective safety.  Nevertheless, there is no 
reason why severe privacy deprivation should ever be considered self-
evident.  Even though the problem seems pre-eminently a matter of mod-
ern times, in 1759, in a time when nation-states were under full construc-
tion, Benjamin Franklin wrote a wisdom that has clearly passed the test 
of time: “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little 
temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.”
161
 We may want to 
keep this in mind. 
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